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Introduction
1 It is now a commonplace to say that a rapidly growing body of scholarly work deals with
the post-socialist transition, understood as ‘[a] broad, complex, and lengthy process of societal
change starting with the refusal of communist regimes and central planning, leading to democratic
political regimes and a market economy’ (Sýkora, 2009, p. 387). As a result, a large amount of
knowledge has  undoubtedly accumulated on the economic,  political  and institutional
transformation  of  post-socialist  cities  (for  the  most  comprehensive  overviews  and
recapitulations, see Andrusz et al., 1996; Stanilov, 2007; Sýkora, 2009, among others). On
the other hand, however, the no less profound cultural changes former socialist cities have
undergone since the beginning of the transition still remain relatively under-theorised
compared  to  the  above  aspects  (for  notable  exceptions,  though,  see  the  works  of
Czepczyński, 2008; Stenning et al., 2010; Diener and Hagen, 2015). In order to contribute to
a more nuanced understanding of  these overwhelming cultural  transformations  (and
thus, to shed light on the complexity of post-socialist urban cultural geographies), this
paper  scrutinises  religiosity in  two  Hungarian  socialist  new  towns,  with  particular
emphasis  placed  on  the  processes  of  secularisation  and  de-secularisation.  Here,  the
former is understood as a systematic erosion of religious practices, values and beliefs
(Norris and Inglehart, 2004, p. 5), whereas the latter is a process through which religion
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reasserts its societal influence in reaction to previous and/or co-occurring secularising
trends (Karpov, 2010, p. 250).
2 After the fall of the Iron Curtain, two separate Europes emerged in terms of religiosity:
the ‘West’, which is – with a few exceptions – getting more and more secularised, and the
post-socialist ‘East’, which is mostly characterised by a process of de-secularisation (see
Smrke and Uhan, 2012, pp. 492-494). In this regard, Hungary is no exception either; the
détente of the socialist regime’s control over the religious sphere led to de-secularisation
and an overall  revival  of  religiosity  at  the  turn of  the  1990s.  According to  the  data
collected by Hungarian sociologist of religion Miklós Tomka, the share of the country’s
adult population who considered themselves religious was 53.9% in 1983, rising to 62.9%
in  1989,  and  then  to  76.8% in  1993  (Tomka,  1995,  p.  18).  This  trend  was,  however,
unfolding in a spatially uneven matter (Kocsis, 2009, pp. 90-95), with a number of typical
areas where religiosity did not increase significantly.  These include (1)  Budapest and
other large cities, (2) the central part of eastern Hungary (where impoverished peasants
had already been highly susceptible to socialist ideas at the turn of the 20th century, and
where the Hungarian Communist Party achieved extraordinary success in 1945), and last
but certainly not least,  (3) heavy industry regions characterised by the dominance of
working-class populations. Concerning the latter, the most representative examples of
these  areas  are  definitely  socialist  new  towns,  the  quintessential  constructs  of  the
inherently atheist experiment of socialist modernity.
3 Our  paper  provides  an  overview  of  religiosity  in  Dunaújváros (former  Stalin  Town,
founded on iron and steel  industries  in  1951)  and in  Kazincbarcika (founded on coal
mining  and  chemical  industries,  also  in  1951)  before  and  during  the  post-socialist
transition. These two case studies, at the same time, also offer broader implications for
the international  literature on (post-)socialist  cities.  Through the enquiry of  the two
towns’ local religious landscapes, two significant, yet unrelated bodies of research are
interlinked; the one on mono-industrial socialist new towns (i.e. urban geography), and
the one on religiosity and various religious practices (i.e. cultural geography).
4 The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we outline the theoretical
background of the empirical  case studies by providing a brief  review of our two key
topics; socialist new towns and the geographies of religion. It is followed by a concise
historical overview of the development of Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika, and then by
the introduction of our research methodology. After that we discuss the most important
results and develop our main arguments. Finally, we draw the conclusions and outline
further research directions.
 
Theoretical background: Socialist new towns and the
geographies of religion
5 In the post-World War II period, there was a programmatic call in state socialist countries
to ‘develop a new pattern for the city which will indicate clearly the inherent unity of the people,
the classlessness of the society’ (Fisher, 1962, p. 252). In this regard, however, ‘the ills inherited
from the era of capitalism’ (ibid.) represented significant barriers; therefore, the most ideal
terrains for the creation of a quintessential form of socialist urbanity were socialist new
towns. In our paper, we understand socialist new towns as settlements that were either
designed  and  constructed  from  scratch,  or  established  through  the  mass-scale
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industrialisation of already existing small villages. Mostly planned and constructed in less
urbanised areas, these towns were politically and economically privileged settlements,
the  beneficiaries  of  the  socialist  countries’  central  redistributive  systems.  They were
characterised by the overwhelming dominance of the industrial sector, accompanied by a
less  significant  services sector.  Even  though  they  were  representative  showcases  of
architectural  modernism,  their  (newly arrived)  local  societies  generally  lacked urban
traditions. In terms of their demography, they were initially characterised by a rapid
population growth and a high share of young age groups (therefore, many of them were
commonly referred to as ‘the city of youth’ – including Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika).
(For more definitions and possible understandings of socialist new towns, see Germuska,
2003 and Uzzoli, 2013) 
6 Since there is no academic (nor lay) consensus about the characteristic features of this
group of settlements, no exact numbers are known either; the understanding of which
towns should be – or should not be – considered as socialist new towns vary from author
to author, as well as from country to country. According to French and Hamilton’s (1979,
p. 6) seminal book on socialist cities, 1.200 new towns have been constructed across the
former Eastern Bloc,  out  of  which more than 1.100 in the area of  the Soviet  Union.
Concerning the satellite states, Wakeman (2014, p. 105) recently estimated that ‘some 60’
new towns have been constructed after the war. In the case of Hungary, given the above
set of criteria, 11 settlements can be defined as socialist new towns: Ajka, Dunaújváros,
Kazincbarcika,  Komló,  Oroszlány,  Ózd,  Paks,  Százhalombatta,  Tatabánya,  Tiszaújváros,
and Várpalota (see also in Szirmai, 2016). It is important to underline that our two case
study towns, Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika are consensually considered as socialist new
towns by all Hungarian authors dealing with the topic (see the extensive literature review
by Germuska, 2003). 
7 Within the confines of this paper, the past and current cultural transformation of these
two towns is  scrutinised in the context of  the geographies  of  religion,  a  long-standing
subfield within human – or, more specifically, cultural – geography. Throughout several
decades of theoretical and empirical work spanning from early attempts (Sopher, 1967) to
more  recent  syntheses  (Stump,  2008),  this  avenue  of  research  is  concerned  with  ‘
examining spatial patterns arising from religious influences, (…) the diffusion of religious beliefs
and organizations,  the relationship between religion and population,  the impact of  religion on
landscape and landscape on religion, religious ecology, and the politics and poetics of religious
landscapes, community and identity’ (Kong, 2009, p. 642). Studies at the nexus of geography
and religion witnessed a remarkable reinvigoration starting from the late 1980s, with the
gradual  retreat  of  the  Berkeley  School’s  traditional  cultural  geography  and  the
simultaneous  emergence  of  new  cultural  geography  (for  a  recapitulation  of  works
published in this turbulent time period, see Kong, 1990). A decade afterwards, the then-
full-fledged new cultural geography’s studies on the topic were deliberately called as ‘new
geographies of religion’, with central issues revolving around the politics and poetics of
religious places, identities and communities, and the sites of religious practices beyond
the ‘officially sacred’. (For a comprehensive literature review of the works produced in
the 1990s, see Kong, 2001). After the turn of the millennia, the topic remained at the
forefront of debates; a special issue of the journal Social & Cultural Geography was aimed
at  ‘[p]lacing  religion and spirituality  in  geography’  (Holloway and Valins,  2002),  a  forum
consisting of six articles was devoted to ‘[t]heorising and studying religion’ in the Annals of
the Association of  American Geographers (Proctor,  2006),  along with another themed
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issue  (also  in  S&CG)  focusing on geography and religion,  as  well  as  on the dialogue
between these two domains (Yorgason and della Dora, 2009)1.
8 Even though the (new) geographies of religion is a significant field of research, relatively
little empirical work has been done on religiosity in (post-)socialist cities. (This research
gap might also be linked to the ‘double exclusion’ of the post-socialist context, i.e. from
the knowledge production of mainstream Western [Anglo–American] theory, as well as
from  its  post-colonial  critiques  –  see  Tuvikene,  2016).  Most  of  the  sources  on  the
(post‑)socialist realm adopt  a  macro-regional  research  focus  (such  as  in  the  case  of
Tomka, 2005; Hann et al., 2006; Pickel and Sammet, 2012; Pollack et al., 2012; Borowik et al.,
2014;  Betts  and Smith,  2016)  or,  partly  as  chapters  of  some of  these  comprehensive
volumes, a national one. On the urban scale, however, in the form of case studies carried
out within (post-)socialist cities,  there is a relative scarcity of literature. Some of the
exceptional counter-examples include the study of popular religiosity in the formerly
closed city of Dnepropetrovsk by Zhuk (2013), some notes on local religious life in Nowa
Huta by Pozniak (2014), or the recent scrutiny of the features of post-secularism in the
religious landscape of Prague by Havlíček and Klingorová (2017). Concerning Hungarian
socialist  new towns,  however,  no  case studies  have  been  conducted  on  the  topic  of
religiosity to date. 
 
An overview of the history of Dunaújváros and
Kazincbarcika
9 Both of our case study towns were constructed in key positions within the socialist era
spatial structure of Hungary (Figure 1).  Dunaújváros – initially, Sztálinváros (i.e. Stalin
Town) – is  situated right by the Danube in the central  part  of  the country,  whereas
Kazincbarcika is located in the hilly area of Northern Hungary, on the country’s so-called
‘energy axis’ (Krajkó, 1982). Both towns lay along different ‘urbanisation axes’ branching
out from the capital city, constituting significant centres of forced industrialisation and
urbanisation from the early socialist period onwards (see Dienes, 1973, p. 36).
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Figure 1. The location of socialist new towns (including Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika) in the
socialist era spatial structure of Hungary.
Source of base map: modiﬁed after Krajkó (1982), socialist new towns added by the authors
10 Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika were both constructed besides smaller settlements with
long histories. Dunaújváros was founded right next to Pentele, a town with a significant
share  of  agricultural  population  and  fishers  (owing  to  its  location  by  the  Danube),
whereas  Kazincbarcika  was  founded on an  empty  tract  of  land besides  two villages,
Sajókazinc and Barcika, having evolved as predominantly agricultural settlements since
the Middle Ages, supplemented by smaller-scale coal mining activity from the mid-19th
century.  The construction of  both new towns  started in  1951,  constituting  the  most
important representative investments of Hungary’s first Five-Year Plan (1950–1954).
11 Dunaújváros was the outcome of the socialist leadership’s idea to turn Hungary into ‘the
country of iron and steel’,  as declared by Ernő Gerő,  the ‘economic Tsar’ of the country
(Berend, 2013, p. 206). However, since Hungary did not have sufficient reserves of iron ore
necessary for the planned metallurgical industries, it had to be shipped from the Soviet
Union via the Black Sea and River Danube. Consequently, riverside locations were sought
as possible sites for the new town: initially an empty area near Mohács – at the country’s
southern border – was designated but it was considered insecure due to Stalin’s split with
Tito’s  Yugoslavia.  Therefore,  a  new  site  near  Pentele  was  chosen,  more  than  100
kilometres north of the originally planned location. Here, the construction of the new
town  went  hand-in-hand  with  that  of  the  Stalin  Steelworks,  the  new  flagship  of
Hungarian heavy industry. Meanwhile, Kazincbarcika was also built at an overwhelming
pace – as a less-propagated episode of the town’s construction, however, not only by
ideologically committed volunteers but also by prisoners of war and political prisoners
from a forced labour camp operating here between 1950 and 1953. Just as in the case of
Dunaújváros,  Kazincbarcika’s  iconic  industrial  facility,  Borsod  Chemical  Plant  is  also
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practically as old as the town itself. In addition to chemical industry, the local mining
sector was significantly boosted as well, and a power plant was also built here.
12 The new town character of Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika is best illustrated by their
long-term  population  dynamics  (Figure  2).  Even  though  they  vary  in  size  (since
Dunaújváros has always been larger), the overall trajectory of their population change is
almost completely identical. Their growth was the fastest during the 1950s and the 1960s,
skyrocketing from the roughly four thousand inhabitants of their ‘ancestor’ settlements
to  several  ten  thousands  within  only  two  decades.  As  bedrocks  of  socialist
industrialisation and modernity, they became showcase cities of state socialist Hungary:
Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev visited Sztálinváros in 1958, whereas Kazincbarcika in
1964. Even though Sztálinváros was renamed to Dunaújváros (literally, ‘New town by the
Danube’)  in  1961,  it  still  remained  a  highly  privileged  settlement.  (The  name  of  its
emblematic symbol, Stalin Steelworks, was changed to Danube Steelworks even earlier, in
1956,  three  years  after  the  death of  Stalin  –  and definitely  as  a  consequence of  the
revolution). The same holds true for Kazincbarcika, as it was also greatly supported by
the central government, becoming one of the wealthiest settlements in socialist Hungary.
 
Figure 2. Population dynamics of Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika between 1930–2017.
Data source: Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (HCSO) – censuses (for the years 1900;
1910; 1920; 1930; 1941; 1949; 1960; 1970; 1980; 1990; 2001; 2011) and the Gazetteer of Hungary
(for 2017)
13 Following this upwards trajectory lasting up to the late-1970s, the first signs of crisis
appeared during the 1980s: in the case of Dunaújváros, it was caused by the decline in
global steel production, while Kazincbarcika was first hit by the mining sector’s crisis, as
a result of which large numbers of local coal miners were laid off. After the collapse of the
socialist regime, the two towns were characterised by diverging development pathways.
In Dunaújváros, the state decided not to privatise – and therefore, saved – the steelworks,
which resulted in a kind of ‘delayed transition’ (although other industries of the town
suffered from the structural crisis of the early-1990s). Kazincbarcika, in contrast, just as
the entire highly industrialised Northern Hungarian region, was in a critical situation
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throughout the 1990s. After the turn of the millennia, both towns received foreign direct
investments: in the case of Dunaújváros’ steel industry (eventually privatised in 2002), it
was  primarily  Ukrainian  (and  then  Russian)  capital,  whereas  in  the  case  of
Kazincbarcika’s chemical industry, it was Chinese capital.
14 Concerning  their  current  situation,  however,  the  two towns  are  still  in  significantly
different  positions.  Based  on  a  complex  index  calculated  by  the  Hungarian  Central
Statistical Office (HCSO) in 2011, a social–economic development ranking of all Hungarian
settlements has been established. In this, Dunaújváros turned out to be the 117th, while
Kazincbarcika the 572nd. (The best ranking socialist new town was Százhalombatta, being
the 18th most developed Hungarian settlement, whereas the worst was Ózd, ranking 2.155
th out of the total number of 3.155 Hungarian settlements). Therefore, Dunaújváros might
be considered as an example of relatively prosperous new towns, whereas Kazincbarcika is
an  example  of  stagnating  ones.  (For  further  details  about  the  historical  and  recent
development trajectories of Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika, see Baranyai, 2016 and Berki,
2016, respectively).
 
Research methods
15 Our  case  studies  on  religiosity  are  based  on  the  analysis  of  quantitative  as  well  as
qualitative data. As an initial step, long-term parochial datasets obtained from the local
churches were analysed. The most important indicator was the number of baptisms per
annum, from which the rate of baptisms per live births (%) was calculated. This indicator
is available for the largest denominations for all years between 1953–2015, in the case of
both  towns;  in  Dunaújváros,  for  Roman  Catholics,  Calvinists,  Lutherans  and  Greek
Catholics, whereas in Kazincbarcika, for Roman Catholics, Calvinists and Greek Catholics.
These datasets allowed us to reconstruct long time series both for the socialist era and the
post-socialist period. (N.B.: The construction of both towns started in 1951, hence this
data  covers  almost  their  entire  existence).  In  addition to  these parochial  sources  on
baptisms, datasets of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO) were also analysed:
since most censuses of the state socialist period (in 1960, 1970, and 1980) did not include
religiosity-related questions for obvious reasons (nor the one carried out in 1990), only
the data of the 2001 and the 2011 censuses could be used. (Prior to these, the last census
which included such questions was the one in 1949, when none of our case study towns
existed).
16 Additionally, in order to gain a deeper understanding of religiosity in the two new towns
during and after the socialist era, these quantitative measures were complemented by
qualitative data derived from in-depth interviews.  The interviews were conducted with
priests, pastors and competent representatives of the local municipalities in both towns.
Our questions were aimed at obtaining historical and recent information on the role of
religiosity  in  local  residents’  everyday  lives  and  on  the  forms  of  people’s  religious
practices, both for traditional and for recently emerged churches. During the socialist
period, religiosity by and large meant the traditional (largest) denominations, however,
after 1989 a remarkable diversification unfolded. It could not only be observed in terms of
(conventional) religiosity but in the case of spirituality in general as well, understood
here  as  a  broader  notion  than  people’s  faith  in  traditional  religious  denominations.
Therefore, the respondents of our interviews were also asked about their perception of
this diversification in the case of both towns.
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 Results and discussion
17 The  general  trend  of  religiosity  in  Hungary  during  the  state  socialist  period,  as
summarised by Tomka (1990), was as follows. As a common phenomenon after wars and
other kinds of armed conflicts, religiosity significantly increased after World War II as
well. It started to decrease after the 1956 revolution and the subsequent realignment of
the socialist system, lasting up to the 1980s with different velocities, followed by a slightly
increasing tendency till  the fall  of the Iron Curtain.  Notably,  our data on the rate of
baptisms per live births (Figure 3) are exactly in line with these trends for the socialist
era, both in the case of Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika. 
 
Figure 3. The annual rate of baptisms per live births in Dunaújváros (top) and Kazincbarcika
(bottom) between 1953–2015 (%).
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Data source: own calculations based on datasets of baptisms obtained from the local
churches, and datasets of annual live births from the Hungarian Central Statistical
Ofﬁce (HCSO)
18 Throughout the 1950s, this rate was exceptionally high. For several years, it was even
above 100% because not only new-born babies were baptised but also a number of older
(previously unbaptised) children whose parents moved into the new towns. According to
our interviews,  the rate of  baptisms could be even higher than shown on the figure
because there were many people who actually lived in Dunaújváros or Kazincbarcika (as
their first dwellers), however, tended to hold the most important and solemn events of
their lives – including the baptism of their children – in the villages they were originating
from. Albeit the rate steadily decreased in the 1960s, it still remained high during that
decade (in fact, higher than in the post-socialist period). It is important to note that our
data for the mid-1960s almost exactly corresponds with the results of a survey carried out
in  the  Soviet  Union  in  1966  (as  cited  by  Pospielovsky,  1988,  p.  192).  That  survey,
conducted among teenagers aged 14–17 (all of them being Komsomol members), revealed
that 52.7% of the respondents were baptised – in comparison, even though we work with
the ‘rate of baptisms per births” instead of the (simple) ‘rate of baptisms’, for the year
1966 our rate was 58.2% in Dunaújváros, and 57.8% in Kazincbarcika. In the Soviet sample,
two additional interesting facts should be pointed out: first, the rate of children baptised
in  larger  towns  and  cities  was  higher  than  in  smaller  towns,  and  second,  a  higher
proportion of industrial workers than of collective farmers have baptised their children.
If such patterns existed in socialist Hungary as well, that might explain the relatively high
rates of baptisms observed in the rapidly booming mono-industrial towns of Dunaújváros
and Kazincbarcika.
19 After the 1960s, the lowest levels of religiosity were observed throughout the 1970s and
the early-1980s in both of our case study towns, partly owing to the (seeming) economic
security of Kádár’s ‘Gulash communism’ which turned Hungary into ‘the happiest
barracks’ of the Eastern Bloc2. Even though sacral objects existed in both towns3, they
were getting more and more sparsely visited. In spite of this decline, however, religiosity
– understood as a rhizomatic formation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) – survived the entire
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state  socialist  period,  even  if  mostly  ‘under  the  surface’.  During  those  decades,  its
offshoots were either ‘cut off’ by the authorities, or were regulated and conformed to the
system.  The  regime’s  attempts  to  ‘cut  back’  religiosity  were  ranging  from  the
appropriation  (nationalisation)  of  church-maintained  schools  and  other  institutions,
through the prohibition (or in some instances, even criminalisation) of religious orders,
to the everyday discrimination of religious people. Later on, the authorities elaborated
more refined techniques to conform religion to the system, such as via surveillance or, as
probably  the  most  well-known  phenomenon,  the  enrolment  of  the  so-called  ‘peace
priests’  (in  order  to  divide  clergy).  As  it  was  reported  by  the  respondents  of  our
interviews, the same (‘soft’) techniques have been used in Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika
as well. Nevertheless, these attempts also created ‘underground’ counter-reactions in a
lot of people, gradually adopting religiosity as a form of anti-socialist attitude. Therefore,
during the state socialist period, religiosity was not simply a connection between humans
and  the  deity,  between  the  mundane  and  the  sacred,  but  for  many  people  it  also
represented a  sort  of  cultural  opposition against  socialist  ideology (or,  more simply,
against authority).
20 After all these years, the offshoots of this rhizomatic formation could come out in various
forms, both old and new, both as the revival of traditional denominations and as the
discovery  of  previously  unknown  ones.  Concerning  the  first,  traditional  churches
witnessed a moderate reinvigoration (as seen on Figure 3): since being religious ceased to
be an official stigma after the fall of state socialism, several new churches were built4, and
the number of church-goers, baptisms and church weddings also apparently increased
(even though this religious stir did not last for a very long time). In addition to that, as
another result of the post-1990 pluralisation of religiosity, a multiplicity of new actors
emerged  beyond the  ‘officially  sacred’  as  well:  besides  the  come-back  of  the  largest
(historical)  Christian  denominations,  several  other  smaller  churches,  religious
movements and faith-based organisations (FBOs) appeared in both towns.
21 In  Dunaújváros,  the  most  significant  and  active  is  the  so-called  Faith  Church  (in
Hungarian, Hit Gyülekezete): beyond religious practices, they pursue charitable activity
as well. Besides them, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Love of Christ Church, the Church of Jesus
Christ  of  Latter-Day  Saints  (LDS),  Seventh-day  Adventist  Church,  and  the  Church  of
Scientology are also present  in the town.  According to our  interviews,  their  familial
atmosphere and novelty turned out to be attractive for many people,  partly because
traditional  denominations  are  considered  by  many  as  too  ‘archaic’  and  less  easily
comprehensible.  The  expansion  of  these  forms  of  religiosity  and  spirituality  in
Dunaújváros might be traced back to another specific reason as well: since the largest
employers of the town are MNCs and TNCs characterised by shift-work schedules, for
most workers it is not easy to attend conventional Sunday masses and church services (as
they usually have only one Sunday off per month). In contrast to that, newer churches
and movements offer more flexible forms of religious practices.  In Kazincbarcika the
Faith Church, Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Seventh-day Adventist Church and the Church of
Scientology are also present, predominantly attracting younger people. As opposed to
Dunaújváros, however, they are not so significant and active in this town (and also own
fewer buildings). Here, on the other hand, traditional Christian denominations have more
bottom-up local organisations, with a broad variety of activities including pastoral care,
charity or youth programmes. They also play an important role in maintaining formerly
state-funded  institutions  including  a  kindergarten,  two  primary  schools  and  two
‘...the opium of the people’? Religiosity in socialist new towns
Belgeo, 4 | 2018
10
secondary  schools,  along  with  two  student  dormitories.  Moreover,  as  a  massive
investment,  Kazincbarcika’s new sports centre was also built  by the Salesians of  Don
Bosco,  opened  in  2016.  Nonetheless,  even  in  spite  of  these  efforts,  our  interviewees
reported an overall crisis of religiosity in Kazincbarcika.
 
Figure 4. The share of people not belonging to any religious communities, churches or
denominations in Hungarian socialist new towns, including Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika (%).
Data source: Hungarian Central Statistical Ofﬁce (HCSO)
22 According to the data of the 2001 census, the share of people not belonging to any religious
communities, churches or denominations was 14.5% in Hungary, increasing to 18.2% in
the latest (2011) census. Compared to these, Figure 4 shows this rate in all socialist new
towns. With the exceptions of Ajka and Paks, all  other new towns’ rate exceeded the
national  average  –  in  Kazincbarcika,  it  was  1.5  times  as  high  in  2011,  whereas  in
Dunaújváros, almost 2 times as high. (Taking into account all new towns, the share on
non-religious  people  was  only  higher  in  the  economically  extremely  disadvantaged
former mining town of  Komló).  Additionally,  the  above-discussed trends  can also  be
linked to these numbers.  In the case of Dunaújváros,  although the role of traditional
Christian denominations is  clearly  shrinking (see Figure 3),  the rate  of  non-religious
people even slightly decreased from 2001 to 2011. As demonstrated above, it might be the
result  of  the  expansion  of  their  recent  alternatives;  smaller  churches,  religious
movements and other FBOs. In contrast to that, in the case of Kazincbarcika, the rate of
non-religious  people  significantly  increased  from  2001  to  2011.  This  is  also  the
consequence of the declining role of traditional Christian denominations (despite their
struggle to keep their believers) – as a notable difference, however, here this tendency
was  not  accompanied  by  the  rise  of  new  kinds  of  religiosity  and/or  spirituality.
Additionally,  Kazincbarcika  experienced  an  immense  deindustrialisation  and
unemployment, and was severely hit by the 2007–2008 financial crunch as well, resulting
in an overall value crisis of the local community. (In terms of economic restructuring,
Dunaújváros might be considered as more fortunate – see Baranyai, 2016).
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23 Finally,  still  concerning  the  share  of  non-religious  people  (derived  from  the  latest
census), spatially uneven patterns were revealed within the internal structure of our case
study towns. In Dunaújváros, the highest proportion of non-believers live in the town’s
newly emerged elite villa quarter and its gated communities, as well as in the town’s
higher-status socialist housing estates. Regarding the latter, as it was widely covered in
Hungarian  media  in  2007–2008,  local  residents  (predominantly  former  and  current
steelworkers) prosecuted the Roman Catholic church because they were disturbed by the
tolling of the bell of the new church built in the middle of the housing estate. In contrast
to  these  areas,  the  lowest  share  of  non-religious  people  live  in  the  town’s  most
impoverished neighbourhood and in the lower-status inner city areas. As opposed to this
spatiality, in the case of Kazincbarcika the highest proportion of non-believers reside in
the dilapidating lower-status socialist  housing estates and in the lower-status (quasi-
rural) fringe of the town. Here, the lowest share of non-religious people live in the former
village centres of Sajókazinc and Barcika, besides which the new town was constructed
from  scratch  –  in  these  areas,  long-suppressed  religious  traditions  were  seemingly
reborn.
 
Conclusions and further research directions
24 Based on our analysis of parochial datasets, census data and the in-depth interviews, two
main conclusions might be drawn. On the one hand, it was revealed that religiosity –
although mostly ‘under the surface’, in a less explicit form – played an important role in
the daily lives of the residents of both Dunaújváros and Kazincbarcika during the state
socialist  period.  This  finding  is  especially  compelling,  since  these  mono-functional
industrial  towns  (should  have)  represented  the  quintessence  of  socialist  urbanity,
planned to be classless and inherently atheist. On the other hand, a remarkable religious
revival might have been expected in the wake of the politico-economic transition, with
the advent of the ‘free world’ (like elsewhere across the former Eastern Bloc). In contrast
to this  assumption,  however,  only a  slightly increasing (and then,  rather stagnating)
religiosity was observed in both case study towns. It might be traced back to the overall
value crisis of these communities after having lost their formerly privileged position.
Therefore, our research results might help us to deconstruct the over-simplified common
view and the  dominant  binary  imaginations  of  ‘atheism under  socialism’  vis-à-vis  ‘a
religious revival in the post-socialist period’.
25 In  order  to  expand  the  scope  of  these  findings,  several  further  possible  research
directions can be outlined. First,  a comparative analysis of religiosity in socialist new
towns and in historical Hungarian towns (for instance, traditional ecclesiastical centres)
with similar population sizes and geographical locations might shed light on the overall
impact of the socialist system on religious life in Hungary. Second, within the confines of
an international comparison, Hungarian socialist new towns might be compared either
with new towns selected from more secularised societies (such as Eastern Germany or the
Czech parts of former Czechoslovakia), or with less secularised ones (such as Poland or
the Croatian part of former Yugoslavia). Third, with an even broader international reach,
former socialist new towns might also be compared with post-World War II ‘Western’ (for
example, British or French) new towns. We argue that such further investigations into
the  topic  may  offer  novel  perspectives  both  for  urban  geographers  and  cultural
geographers.  Since the topic  of  religiosity  is  still  almost  completely absent  from the
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international  academic discourses on socialist  new towns,  our paper might hopefully
serve as an initial step towards filling this gap in the broader domain of urban cultural
geography.
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NOTES
1. Beyond this Anglo-American dominance, it has to be noted that significant contributions have
been made to the discourse on religiosity by authors from other countries as well, although not
always from an explicitly geographical perspective. Among others, reference has to be made to
the  religiosity-related  publications  of  Hungarian–French  political  scientist  François  Fejtő,
German  theologian  Thomas  Bremer,  Austrian  theologian  Paul  Michael  Zulehner,  Austrian
psychologist and psychotherapist Wilfried Daim, Belgian Roman Catholic dean Claude Castiau,
Polish historian Jerzy Kłoczowski, Ukrainian–British–Canadian scholar Taras Kuzio, or Russian
historian Leonid Luks. In addition, a number of other sources have to be mentioned as well, such
as  the  volumes  of  the  ‘Ost-West  Informationsdienst  des  Katholischen  Arbeitskreises  für
zeitgeschichtliche Fragen’, the journal ‘Transit – Europäische Revue’ (established in Vienna), the
Belgian journal  ‘Irenikon’,  the  French journals  ‘Istina’  and ‘Cadmos’,  or  the  French-language
weekly entitled ‘Golias’.
2. Nonetheless, it has to be noted that this secularisation was a more general phenomenon in
that  time  period,  observed  both  in  Western  Europe  and  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,
irrespective of the countries’ underlying socio-political systems.
3. There was a Roman Catholic and a Greek Catholic church in Dunaújváros, along with a Roman
Catholic and two Calvinist churches in Kazincbarcika, all of these being located on the area of the
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new  towns’ ‘ancestor’  settlements,  dating  back  to  much  earlier  historical  periods.  The  only
notable exception is a Calvinist church in Dunaújváros that was built in the late-socialist period,
during 1982 and 1985 — however, although it was eventually permitted by the authorities after a
rather long struggle, it could only be built in an out-of-the-way location, and had to reflect the
town’s steel  industry profile (its  chandeliers,  for instance,  were manufactured in the Danube
Steelworks).  According to  our  interviews,  when believers  first  saw the  plans,  they said  they
wanted a church but they were told that the building would either look like that, or there would
be no church at all.
4. In Dunaújváros, the construction works of a Lutheran church started in 1992, and that of a
Roman Catholic one in 1993 (even though the latter was only consecrated as late as in 2008),
whereas in the case of Kazincbarcika, a Greek Catholic church was started to be built in 1992,
along with a Roman Catholic one later, in 2003.
ABSTRACTS
Although an undoubtedly growing body of scholarly work deals with the economic, political and
institutional transformation of post-socialist cities, the no less profound cultural changes former
socialist cities have undergone since the beginning of the transition still remain relatively under-
theorised.  In  order  to  contribute  to  a  more  nuanced  understanding  of  these  overwhelming
cultural transformations, this paper scrutinises religiosity in two Hungarian socialist new towns,
Dunaújváros  and  Kazincbarcika,  during  and  after  socialism.  Our  case  studies  are  based  on
quantitative and qualitative research methods: in addition to the analysis of religiosity-related
census  data  and  long-term  parochial  datasets  obtained  from  the  local  churches,  in-depth
interviews  were  also  conducted  with  priests,  pastors  and  representatives  of  the  local
municipalities. 
Based on our analyses, two main research results might be outlined. On the one hand, it was
revealed that religiosity – although mostly ‘under the surface’, in a less explicit form – played an
important role in the daily lives of the residents of both new towns during the state socialist
period.  This  finding  is  especially  compelling,  since  these  mono-functional  industrial  towns
(should have)  represented the quintessence of  socialist  urbanity,  planned to be classless  and
inherently atheist. On the other hand, a remarkable religious revival might have been expected
in the wake of the politico-economic transition, with the advent of the ‘free world’. In contrast to
this assumption, however, only a slightly increasing (and then, rather stagnating) religiosity was
observed in both case study towns. It might be traced back to the overall value crisis of these
communities after having lost their formerly privileged position. Therefore, our research results
might help us to deconstruct the over-simplified common view of ‘atheism under socialism’ vis-
à-vis ‘a religious revival in the post-socialist period’.
En dépit du fait que des recherches de plus en plus nombreuses sont consacrées à la mutation
économique,  politique et institutionnelle des villes post-socialistes,  les changements culturels
majeurs  auxquels  ont  été  confrontées  les  anciennes  villes  socialistes  depuis  le  début  de  la
transition restent toujours relativement peu théorisés. Pour mieux comprendre ce phénomène,
cet article se penche sur la question de la religiosité dans deux villes nouvelles socialistes de
Hongrie pendant et après le socialisme : Dunaújváros et Kazincbarcika. Notre étude de cas se base
sur des méthodes quantitatives et qualitatives: outre l’analyse des données du recensement en
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relation avec la religiosité et les données paroissiales obtenues des églises locales, des entretiens
approfondis ont été menés avec des prêtres, des pasteurs et des représentants des municipalités
locales. Suite à notre analyse, deux résultats principaux peuvent être mis en évidence : d'un côté,
la religiosité – bien que surtout de façon superficielle – a joué un rôle important dans la vie
quotidienne  des  habitants  des  deux  villes  sous  le  socialisme.  Une  telle  observation  est
particulièrement inattendue, vu que les villes industrielles monofonctionnelles représentaient
(auraient dû représenter) la quintessence de l'urbanisme socialiste, planifié pour être une société
sans classes et forcément athée. D'autre part, on aurait pu s'attendre à un renouveau religieux
considérable avec l'avènement du « monde libre ». Cependant, nous ne pouvons constater qu'une
une  augmentation  minime  (ou  plutôt  stagnante)  dans  les  deux  cas  étudiés.  Cela  pourrait
s'expliquer par la crise de valeurs de ces communautés après la perte de leur position autrefois
privilégiée.  En  conséquence,  les  résultats  de  notre  recherche  pourraient  contribuer  à
déconstruire le  point de vue simpliste de « l’athéisme sous le  régime socialiste »  vis-à-vis  du
« renouveau religieux dans la période post-socialiste ».
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